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THE U.K. SUPREME COURT AT WAR
Po Jen Yap †
Abstract: This article contends that the underlying normative assumptions of civil
libertarians and national security “executive unilateralists” are premised on a variant of
the “nirvana fallacy.” In other words, civil libertarians generate a best-case scenario for
rigorous judicial oversight over executive action during emergencies and compare it to
the worst-case scenario for executive action; the reverse holds true for executive
unilateralists. In practice, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has been cognizant
of the institutional advantages and limitations of its office when it adjudicates national
security disputes, and has not succumbed to the criticisms of scholars in either camp.
Instead, since the September 11th terrorist attacks, there has been a strong correlation
between the degree of judicial deference displayed to the executive on national security
matters and the information made available to the Court. In other words, the intensity of
the judicial oversight of various counter-terrorism measures increases when an
emergency wanes and the Court receives credible information that the impugned
governmental measures are ineffective or unnecessary in addressing the perceived
national security threats.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks (“9/11”) and
similar tragedies across the globe, governments around the world have
responded by passing a slew of legislative sanctions that seek to combat this
global national security threat.1 The United Kingdom’s government, like
many of its foreign counterparts, has frequently contended that, in times of
national crisis, democracies must recalibrate their institutional processes and
reinterpret their legal norms to accept more intrusive encroachments on
personal liberty that would usually be considered unacceptable during
“normal” times.2 The British judiciary, in particular the Supreme Court (and
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords), has also entered the fray as
they are tasked to review and rule on the legality of several contentious
governmental measures.3 However, as these judges sit at trial, they too also
†
LL.B. (NUS); LL.M. (Harvard); LL.M. (London) Ph.D. (Cambridge); Associate Professor,
University of Hong Kong. The author would like to thank Cora Chan and Mark Tushnet for all their
insightful comments. All errors are the author’s own.
1
See generally KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM (Cambridge
2011).
2
See id. at 241-44.
3
See A & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68
(H.L.); A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2), [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221
(H.L.); Gillan, R v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Anor, [2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 A.C.
307 (H.L.); Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 A.C. 385 (H.L.);
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. E, [2007] UKHL 47, [2008] 1 A.C. 499 (H.L.); Secretary of
State for the Home Department v. AF, [2009] UKHL 28, [2010] 2 A.C. 269 (H.L.).
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stand trial4 when their decisions are judged in the court of public opinion and
are critiqued within the walls of academia.
Unsurprisingly, commentators have published a plethora of academic
literature on how courts should address these legal challenges against
governmental counter-terrorism efforts. 5 However, this discourse on
national security has been dominated by the assertions of two polarized
factions. On one side, we have the “executive unilateralists”6 who argue that
courts—especially during emergencies or periods of crisis—should
generally defer to governmental determinations on national security.7 These
scholars contend that delay and uncertainty would result from the judicial
review of national security disputes and impose unacceptable costs on
executive power. Furthermore, “judicial deference is both desirable and
predictable, given the high stakes and the judges’ limited information and
competence.”8 On the other side, we have the civil libertarians who insist
that judges should never acquiesce to governmental intrusions on human
rights, even in times of public emergencies, and that courts must be vigilant
and provide robust oversight over state action at all times.9 They believe
that public bodies tend to overreact and that “the government’s own
assessment may be colored by fear of the electoral response and—less
charitably—by calculations of electoral advantage,”10 such that it is vital for
the courts to subject the assertions of the executive to “searching
examination.”11
A central purpose of this article is to show why both opposing,
strident views are normatively untenable and unsustainable, and why it is
unsurprising that neither viewpoint has been accepted in practice by the
4
See Aharon Barak, Some Reflections on the Israeli Legal System and Its Judiciary, 6.1
ELECTRONIC J. OF COMP. L. (2002), http://ejcl.org/61/art61-1.html.
5
See Fiona de Londras & Fergal F. Davis, Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism:
Competing Perspectives on Effective Oversight Mechanisms, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 19 (2010); David
Feldman, Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: The Role of Politicians and Judges, PUB. L. 364 (2006);
Allen Kavanagh, Judging the Judges under the Human Rights Act: Deference, Disillusionment and the
‘War on Terror’, PUB. L. 287 (2009).
6
See Samuel Issacharoff & R. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism:
An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2004).
7
See John Finnis, Nationality, Alienage and Constitutional Principle (University of Oxford Faculty
of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08, 2008); David Campbell, The Threat of
Terror and the Plausibility of Positivism, PUB. L. 501 (2009).
8
ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
COURTS 91 (2007).
9
See Feldman, supra note 5; FIONA DE LONDRAS, DETENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR: CAN
HUMAN RIGHTS FIGHT BACK? (2011); Cora Chan, Proportionality and Invariable Baseline Intensity of
Review, 33(1) LEGAL STUD. 1 (2013).
10
E. Metcalfe, Terror, Reason and Rights, in CIVIL LIBERTIES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND PROSPECTS
FOR CONSENSUS 178 (E. Reed and M. Dumper eds., 2012).
11
See Feldman, supra note 5, at 379.
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House of Lords and its succeeding body, the Supreme Court (hereinafter
referred to collectively as “the Court”) in the post-9/11 cases. It is my
contention that the underlying normative assumptions of scholars in both
camps are premised on a variant of the “nirvana fallacy.” Civil libertarians
generate a best-case scenario for rigorous judicial oversight of executive
action during emergencies and compare it to the worst-case scenario for
executive action, while the reverse holds true for executive unilateralists.
Realistically, judges on the Court are insulated from the political winds and
are arguably more impartial in reviewing challenges to governmental action.
However, they are comparatively more limited in their access to the requisite
national security information and lack the training to make the predictive
risk assessments on the necessity of national security measures. On the
other hand, while it is equally true that, in times of crisis, the executive
branch possesses the “speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other
governmental institution can match,”12 the need to assuage public fear and
moral panics may distort the objectivity of the executive’s assessments. The
main trade-off in the institutional design of security policy is between
freedom from bias and information.13
This article contends that the Court has been generally cognizant of
the institutional advantages and limitations of its office when adjudicating
national security disputes, and has not succumbed to criticisms. Instead,
there has been an inverse correlation between the degree of judicial
deference displayed to the executive on national security matters and the
information made available to the Court since 9/11. In other words, the
intensity of the judicial oversight over various counter-terrorism measures
increases when an emergency wanes, and the Court receives credible
information that the impugned governmental measures are ineffective or
unnecessary in addressing the perceived national security threats. As time
passes, the Court often acquires more information, thereby narrowing the
epistemic gap between the judges and the executive. Conversely, where the
Court was not privy to the intelligence on which executive anticipatory riskassessments were based, and where the costs of judicial errors were
particularly high, the judiciary generally erred on the side of caution and
deferred to the executive’s national security determinations.
This article’s central argument is that there exists an inverse
relationship between the amount of information the Court has, and the level
of judicial deference it affords the government. While many civil
12
13

See HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 119 (1990).
ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 86 (2008).
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libertarians such as Fiona de Londras,14 Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, and Oren
Gross15 have also argued for a “sliding scale” of judicial deference, their
arguments are premised solely on rights-based concerns: the judicial review
of state action must become more rigorous over time because of the adverse
impact on the individual, as the length of his or her rights-deprivation
increases. 16 This article’s argument is different and novel so far as it
explains and justifies this inverse relationship between time and judicial
deference on informational grounds.
This article will focus only on the case law of the Court and the
judicial approach it adopts vis-à-vis national security. While Adam Tomkins
has published an illuminating article on how courts at first instance have
scrutinized national security determinations by the government more
intensely than the Court has,17 this article argues that the more activist stance
taken by the lower courts should not affect how the Court behaves. These
courts of first instance—i.e., the Administrative Court, the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”), and the Proscribed
Organisations Appeal Commission—are all specialized tribunals, while the
Court is a generalist one. 18 Specialist judges who routinely deal with
national security issues would naturally build up a considerable body of
experience and expertise in the area, and they would—over time—become
very seasoned at assessing the credibility of the State’s national security
claims.19 Judges on the Court generally do not have such security expertise
or specialized on-job training, and deference is thus a rational response to
these epistemic conditions of uncertainty associated with such adjudication.
Furthermore, courts of first instance have the “luxury” of having their errors
corrected by the appellate courts, whereas the Court shoulders the burden of
having the last (judicial) word. If aggressive judicial review, which hampers
counter-terrorism efforts, can (rightly or wrongly) incur the government’s
wrath or public outrage, then prudential constraints may counsel the Court’s

14

See Fiona de Londras, Can Counter-terrorist Internment Ever be Legitimate?, 33 HUM. RTS. Q.
593 (2011).
15
See Fionnuala Ni Aoláin and Oren Gross, A Skeptical View of Deference to the Executive in Times
of Crisis, 41 ISR. L. REV. 545 (2008).
16
See de Londras, supra note 14, at 596; Aoláin and Gross, supra note 15, at 559.
17
See Adam Tomkins, National Security and the Role of Court: A Changed Landscape?, L. Q. REV.
543 (2010).
18
Id. at 545.
19
One may note that for the SIAC, in particular, an expert on security matters would usually be
a member of the panel. See Appeal to the Special Immigr. Appeals Comm’n, HM COURTS & TRIBUNAL
SERV. (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/special-immigration-appeals-commission.
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judicial restraint.20 This is so because the Court always bears the ultimate
responsibility for any unintended consequences of judicial mistakes.
Part II of this article begins with an examination of the case for
judicial deference as advanced by renowned executive unilateralists such as
John Yoo, 21 Eric Posner, 22 and Adrian Vermeule. 23 In addition, Part II
explores the normative arguments in favor of robust judicial review over
national security matters, as commonly advanced by eminent civil
libertarians such as David Feldman24 and Fiona de Londras.25 The aim in
Part II is to explain how scholars in both camps have viewed their preferred
public institution through rose-tinted glasses, as they only see the
institutional advantages that their preferred institution enjoys in national
security determinations, while failing to account for the institutional
disadvantages inherent in the office. Next, in Part III, this article illustrates
and elaborates on how, since 9/11, the Court has sought to mediate the
polarized demands of the executive unilateralists and the civil libertarians by
increasing the level of judicial scrutiny over state action as it acquires more
information over time.
II.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLARITY: EXECUTIVE UNILATERALISM AND
CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM

Professor John Yoo is a strident executive unilateralist.26 Central to
the case for judicial deference in times of national emergencies is his
argument that the judiciary is ill-equipped to acquire, investigate, and
process information on national security. As he observes:
The executive branch, by contrast, can collect information
through agency experts, a national and global network of
officials and agents, and connections with outside groups and
foreign governments . . . . Courts do not operate the broad
network of information sources that is available to the executive
branch, nor can it benefit from the informal methods of
information collection the legislature has at its disposal.27
20

See A. Kavanagh, Deference or Defiance? The Limits of the Judicial Role in Constitutional Role
in Adjudication, in EXPOUNDING THE CONSTITUTION 209 (Grant Huscroft ed., 2008).
21
See J. Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573 (2006).
22
See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8.
23
See id.
24
See Feldman, supra note 5.
25
See DE LONDRAS, supra note 9.
26
See Yoo, supra note 21.
27
Id. at 593.
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Furthermore, once the judiciary has made a decision based on the
information available to it at a given time, it generally cannot reverse
itself—until another case raising the same issue arises again—even if the
additional information would lead the court to change its mind.28 If the
disputed decision is from a court of final resort, it may be years before this
new information can be addressed by that same body. In the meantime, the
executive would be hamstrung by this delay, and time is of the essence when
the government is seeking to combat threats to national security.
In the same vein, Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have
emphasized the informational deficits from which the courts suffer.29 More
significantly, however, they attempt to eviscerate the arguments oftadvanced by civil libertarians that, during emergencies, governments tend to
panic and exaggerate the severity of national security threats, and inflict the
costs of increased security measures on unpopular minorities.30 Not only do
these learned scholars disbelieve that unpopular minorities would be subject
to “scapegoating” during emergencies, they actually argue that emergencies
would enhance the political position of these minorities: “[B]ecause
emergencies capture the attention of the public, it will be more difficult for
the government to conceal oppressive or redistributive policies, making it
easier to mobilise opposition to such policies.”31
More incredulously, these scholars present a rosy picture of why
states would not engage in greater discrimination against foreigners during
periods of emergencies. In such an event, the voting majority would want
foreigners to come to its country and contribute to its economy and
workforce, and the good treatment of one’s nationals abroad is dependent on
each state extending due process to aliens on its own soil.32
Firstly, one must note that the question of whether the political status
of weak or unpopular minorities is actually enhanced during emergencies is
an empirical one, for which the authors have conceded that they provide no
such evidence.33
Secondly, while the authors’ conjectures are not patently false, they
are undeniably viewing state action through rose-tinted glasses. More
plausible and realistic are scenarios where, in times of crisis, fear prevails
and emotions run high. In such times, the general public is willing to
condone immeasurably more draconian measures, especially if the
28
29
30
31
32
33

See id.
See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 31.
See id. at 87.
Id. at 110-11.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 32.
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externalities of such measures are only foisted upon unpopular segments of
society perceived to be responsible for the crisis. In times of emergencies,
governments have every incentive to overreact, for the general public would
be comparatively less forgiving if another terrorist attack were to occur very
soon. Therefore, the government’s assessments of national security may be
colored by its fear of the electoral response or even by calculations of
electoral advantage.34 It is true that in most countries, including the United
Kingdom, the protection of their nationals abroad is dependent on some
measure of reciprocity. However, foreign governments may also condone a
state’s use of draconian counter-terrorism measures against their own
nationals if the foreign governments themselves are domestically applying
similar measures against this same group of perceived terrorists. Therefore,
as Professor de Londras rightly observed, the analyses of Posner and
Vermeule do not properly take into account “either the historical patterns of
expansionism in counter-terrorist laws and policies or the ballot-box effect
of a traumatised, panicked and collectively victimised populace”35 during
emergencies.
Thirdly, executive unilateralists tend to give short shrift to the very
real possibility that governments rarely relinquish the emergency powers
that they have been conferred, even after the crisis in question has waned or
abated.36 It is one thing to acknowledge that there is a liberty-security tradeoff that one must accept in a time of crisis; it is another thing altogether to
sustain the executive’s use of such emergency powers indefinitely. If courts
were to never scrutinize governmental claims on national security, the
(supposed) emergency may never come to a close. Substantive research into
the use of emergency powers globally has always shown that such
extraordinary powers persist, and they are rarely “short term appearances on
the legal landscape of states.”37 Their endurance or permanent entrenchment
will spell the end and dissolve the rule of law on which these extraordinary
measures were justified.38
Therefore, while the executive unilateralists are not wrong in
emphasizing that the judiciary is institutionally less equipped than the
executive branch to acquire and process national security information, these
scholars give too little credence to the very real risks of bias when the
executive engages in national security determinations.
34

See Metcalfe, supra note 10, at 178.
See DE LONDRAS, supra note 9, at 225.
36
See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8; see Yoo, supra note 21.
37
Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, Terror Conflated, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 131, 134 (2008).
38
Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION AT
WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 45, 45 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
35
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Civil libertarians, on the other hand, present a dismal view of the
governmental use of national security measures during national emergencies.
Professor David Feldman has emphasized that it is important to subject the
security of the police and the security service on risk levels to “searching
examination.”39 Public bodies generally do not want to face the public
obloquy and legal liabilities that might follow from various terror-related
events. In turn they would have every incentive to overestimate security
risks and be overly defensive in their responses to them.40
In the same vein, Professor Fiona de Londras has been extremely
sanguine about the judiciary’s capacity to review security-related laws and
policies.41 According to de Londras, the sensitive nature of national security
secrets should not pose a barrier to judicial review because mechanisms can
be developed to allow for their careful, considered release to the courts.42 In
the United Kingdom, this has taken the form of Special Advocates, who
have some access to such confidential information and may make pleadings
on behalf of suspected terrorists, subject to control orders issued under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.43 Furthermore, de Londras considers that
arguments concerning the limited institutional competence of courts are
simply fallacious; judges constantly make legal decisions on matters they
have little expertise on, such as medical treatment, tax arrangements, and the
environment.44 There is therefore no reason why the judiciary is incapable
of doing the same on security matters.45
The civil libertarians usually strengthen their case for robust judicial
review by pointing to the spectacular debacles of the executive’s national
security determinations—e.g., the failure to uncover weapons of mass
destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the wrongful killing of Jean
Charles de Menezes by the police in the London Underground. They also
point out that judicial deference during many periods of major national
security emergencies has only led to the continuous and unnecessary
repression of minorities—e.g., the internment of Japanese Americans46 or
the detention of alleged Nazi sympathizers during World War II.47
39

See Feldman, supra note 5, at 379.
Id.
41
See Fiona de Londras, Guantanamo Bay: Towards Legality?, 71 MOD. L. REV. 36 (2008).
42
See id.
43
Aileen Kavanagh, Special Advocates, Control Orders and the Right to a Fair Trial 73(5) MOD. L.
REV. 824, 838 (2010).
44
See de Londras, supra note 41, at 50-51.
45
Id.
46
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
47
Liversidge v. Anderson, [1941] UKHL 1, [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L.).
40
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One must also note that the civil libertarians’ claims are often tainted
with “hindsight bias.”48 Once a national emergency has abated, or where
new information is revealed, the judicial deference displayed by courts can
be easily characterized as unjustified ex post.49 But when judges are ex ante
confronted with an emergency, and where they are operating under
conditions of epistemic uncertainty as to the outcome of the war and the
necessity of the impugned security measures in meeting a particular national
security threat, it is unfair to review their actions though the lens of calmer
times.50 As Professor Mark Tushnet has astutely observed, the “glow of
success reflects backward and affects our evaluations.”51
Civil libertarians may point to specific monumental failures of the
executive, but they have not demonstrated how judges generally, vis-à-vis
the executive, are better at acquiring, processing, and evaluating national
security information. De Londras, as discussed above, may argue that courts
routinely deal with matters that they are not experts of, which may well be
true; however, assessing national security is qualitatively different from
determining culpability in medical malpractice or environmental claims.
Determinations made in the national security arena are usually anticipatory;
they are based on risk-assessments and factual predictions of what people
might or might not do in the future.52 Such disputes are unlike claims in
torts or contracts, complicated as they maybe, where judges are assessing
liability for past actions. This is not to say that generalist judges never
engage in anticipatory assessments in their daily routine. However,
predictive appraisals in the realm of family law, and the scale of adverse
consequences that may follow from judicial errors, make such decisions
qualitatively different from the specialized nature of national security
determinations; the former task is more within the ken of generalist judges
on the Court.
Furthermore, national security information is often derived from
classified sources. The government may reasonably fear that the disclosure
of such evidence in litigation will adversely affect its ability to use it in the
future, thereby compromising the flow of valuable counter-terrorism
intelligence. 53 This argument is not based on a fanciful, imaginary
projection of some right-wing zealot, but is actually premised on the realities
48

See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 147.
Id. at 44.
50
Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu? Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, in THE
CONSTITUTION AT WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 125, 125 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
51
Id.
52
See Kavanagh, supra note 20.
53
See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009).
49
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of national security. It is now known that as a consequence of Omar AbdelRahman’s prosecution for the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the
United States government was required to hand over a list of unindicted coconspirators to his defense team, which had included Osama bin Laden’s
name.54 Within ten days of the release of this list, bin Laden was alerted to
the fact that his involvement in the terrorist bombing had been uncovered.55
During Ramzi Yousef’s trial for the same bombing, testimonial evidence
presented in court about the delivery of a cell phone battery tipped off the
other terrorists still at large that one of their communication links had been
compromised. 56 The government lost an extremely valuable source of
intelligence as a consequence.57
Civil libertarians may respond, as has De Londras, that classified,
sensitive information may be disclosed only to Special Advocates that
represent terrorist suspects in the “closed materials” hearings.58 This is an
important concession, but one must note that many civil libertarians are
highly critical of this Special Advocate “closed materials” system.59 In any
case, within the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court has on several
occasions refused to examine the “closed” materials, even when this
opportunity was offered to the Law Lords.60 One does wonder whether it is
possible for the Court to make accurate national security determinations, visà-vis the executive, if it insists on adjudicating behind a veil of ignorance.
Unfazed by the abovementioned epistemic disadvantages inherent in
the judicial office, Cora Chan has argued that the government must always
prove why the judiciary should defer to them on second-order grounds.61
According to Chan, “claims of second-order expertise usually take the form
of the government, generally, having expertise in deciding the type of issue
in question”62—i.e., the fact that the government was usually correct in
deciding this type of issue in the past is a reason for deference this time.
Therefore, for Chan, second-order claims of superior expertise in national
security can “only be validly established if the government body can adduce
54

See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 284 (2008).
Id. at 284.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
See de Londras, supra note 41, at 50.
59
See Helen Fenwick & Gavin Phillipson, Covert Derogations and Judicial Deference: Redefining
Liberty and Due Process Rights in Counterterrorism Law and Beyond, 56 MCGILL L. J. 863 (2011).
60
See RB (Algeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009] UKHL 10, [2010] 2 A.C.
110 (H.L.).
61
See Chan, supra note 9.
62
See Cora Chan, Deference, Expertise and Information-Gathering Powers, 33 LEGAL STUD. 598,
602 (2013).
55
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evidence, such as its institutional features, qualifications, and past
performance, to persuade the court that it indeed possess the said general
expertise or useful intelligence.”63 In particular, Chan has suggested as
follows:
First, the government is to adduce positive evidence to show
that the institution which it is asking the court to defer to had
previously made correct judgments in the type of issues
concerned and/or that its sources of information were reliable in
the past. The litigant then has an evidential burden to expose
negative records of the government’s body’s credibility and
point out the institutional problems that these blunders expose .
. . . If the litigant can discharge its evidential burden, the
government must then try to show that the asserted institutional
problems exposed by past mistakes have been solved or are not
applicable in the present case.64
For Chan, the burden is on the government to prove this second-order
comparative expertise on a balance of probability.65
This argument is untenable for national security matters. If courts
judge the government’s comparative expertise on records that are already in
the public domain, this stance will inevitably always disadvantage the
government’s case, as the more compelling evidence for the government’s
case on national security will be classified. Alternatively, if courts compel
the government to declassify and disclose confidential information so that it
can meet this onerous burden of proof—e.g., sources and intelligence
revealed by covert operations—national security will generally be
compromised. Chan may argue that it is not inevitable that the release of
such secret information would jeopardize national security, but without the
benefit of hindsight, judges would never ex ante know. Furthermore, Chan
is not merely asking for the government to adduce “some evidence,”66 as she
purports to claim; she wants the State to prove its second-order comparative
expertise on a balance of probability.67 The implications flowing from her
bold claims are indeed breathtaking.
More importantly, many civil libertarians, including Chan, often
neglect the fact that, unlike judicial findings in torts or contractual disputes,
decisions made in the realm of national security often have life and death
63
64
65
66
67

Chan, supra note 9, at 12.
Chan, supra note 62, at 613.
Chan, supra note 9, at 15.
Chan, supra note 62, at 617.
Chan, supra note 9, at 15.
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consequences. In times of national emergencies—and in view of the
sensitive nature of (covert) security operations and the potentially grave
consequences of hampering speedy executive action—it is prudent for the
judiciary to respond to these conditions of epistemic uncertainty by deferring
to the political branches of the government. This is because courts neither
have the requisite expertise to accurately assess the risks facing the country
nor have the resources to address these threats.68 Deference is a rational
choice, especially during emergencies when time is at a premium and the
consequences of erroneously obstructing necessary security measures are
dire for the nation.
However, this is not to say that judges should always acquiesce to the
government’s purported claims of a national emergency. As the country
moves away from a specific exigency, the courts should calibrate their
degree of review and re-subject governmental actions to closer scrutiny.
Logically, the national security threat that a country is under is no less
serious immediately before a specific exigency than afterwards. Why, then,
should the standard of review change with time? It changes because, when a
crisis is fresh, time is at a premium. 69 Prudent judges, with limited
information, would naturally defer to the government on how to respond to
this new threat. As time passes, judges often acquire more information,
thereby narrowing the epistemic gap between them and the executive.70 This
judicial re-calibration is also necessary as executive unilateralists tend to
give short shrift to the staying power of emergencies, and opportunistic
governmental officials have every incentive to retain these extraordinary
powers even after the crisis has abated.
Therefore, it falls on the independent judiciary to re-assert control
after the emergency has waned or where previously unavailable credible
information surfaces that makes the government’s argument for a specific
national security measure untenable.
III.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND A VARIABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW

As discussed above, executive unilateralists and civil libertarians are
viewing the national security decisions of their preferred branch of
government through rose-tinted glasses. They only notice the institutional
advantages their preferred branch enjoys in national security assessments
and fail to account for the institutional disadvantages inherent in that office.
68
69
70
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Fortunately, this is not the practice of the Court in the United
Kingdom. Since the 9/11 attacks, the Law Lords are very cognizant of their
epistemic advantages and limitations. They have always varied the standard
of review that they apply vis-à-vis the executive’s national security
determinations according to the exigency of time and the requisite
intelligence disclosed to them.
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, 71 the
House of Lords unanimously ruled that the Home Secretary could deport a
Pakistani national on the grounds that his deportation was conducive to the
public good for national security reasons due to his association with Islamic
terrorist groups.72 More importantly, the Law Lords emphasized that “due
weight” 73 and “proper deference” 74 must be accorded to the executive’s
determination of what would be in the interests of national security.75
This decision has been subject to academic criticism by civil
libertarians.76 In particular, Colin Harvey has so observed:
To defer mainly because it is an executive decision based on the
assessments of the national security threat is problematic . . . .
In the national security context, the rule of law is tested, both in
the sense of protecting individual rights and ensuring that an
effective regulatory framework exists. By according decisive
weight to the views of the executive, judges are not discharging
their responsibility to take a view on the meaning of law. If
courts do this, they risk abandoning one of the values of the rule
of law: the defence of the person against arbitrary power
through an established legal framework properly interpreted
and applied.77
However, what the rule of law means is contestable and can be upheld in a
variety of ways.78 Unfortunately, Harvey and many other civil libertarians
do not demonstrate why the judges’ first-order assessments in the national
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security context will always be the correct determination, especially in light
of the epistemic uncertainties inherent in the adjudication of such cases.
Fortunately, the Law Lords in Rehman were less sanguine about the
institutional capabilities of the judiciary within the national security
context.79 Lord Hoffmann, who wrote the leading judgment, observed:
[I]n matters of national security, the costs of failure can be high.
This seems to me to underline the need for the judicial arm of
government to respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown
on the question of whether support for terrorist activities in a
foreign country constitutes a threat to national security. It is not
only that the executive has access to special information and
expertise in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with
serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy
which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons
responsible to the community through the democratic process.80
As deferential as the judiciary may have been to the executive, we
must read Rehman in context. This decision was handed down within a
month of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and, as recognized by a judge as liberal as
Lord Steyn, “the tragic events of 11 September 2001 in New York reinforce
compellingly that no other approach is possible.”81 Without the benefit of
any information on how vulnerable the United Kingdom was to similar
terrorist attacks at that time, and acknowledging how salient the devastation
of the terrorist attacks were, judicial deference would be a rational and
reasonable response to the existing conditions of uncertainty. Furthermore,
one must note that the House of Lords in Rehman had not conferred upon
the government unbridled powers to pursue whatever national security
measure they deemed fit. As observed by the House of Lords, the judiciary
would still have intervened if “the decision to deport was not based on
grounds of national security,”82 or the decision to deport was “one which no
reasonable minister advising the Crown could in the circumstances
reasonably have held;”83 however, both exceptions were inapplicable on the
facts.
The House of Lords was next confronted with the legality of a
national security measure in the landmark decision of A & Ors v. Secretary
79
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of State for the Home Department.84 In that case, the Government had
derogated from Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights85
(“ECHR”) and passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,86
which allowed for the indefinite detention without trial of suspected foreign
terrorists. Nine detainees subsequently challenged the legality of these
national security measures.87 When the case came before the House of
Lords, a majority on the nine-person panel accepted that a public emergency
threatened the life of the nation, but they also ruled that the executive power
to detain without trial was not “strictly required” by the emergency in
question.88 By an eight-to-one majority, the House of Lords invalidated the
derogation order and declared that the impugned statutory provisions were
incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”).89
This decision has engendered much celebration and criticism.90 A few
civil libertarians expressed disappointment that the majority did not go far
enough, as it deferred to the Government’s assessment that the United
Kingdom was in a state of public emergency even in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence.91 As Professor Adam Tomkins asked rhetorically:
How did the House of Lords know that there was a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation? 92 In the same vein, Tom Hickman
lamented in the following terms: “Bizarrely, by his own tactical decision not
to show his hand, the Attorney General was thus relieved from justifying his
decision to the standard required.”93 The learned scholars were not wrong to
raise these concerns, but a crucial question is what alternative options the
Law Lords had. The Attorney General expressly declined to ask the House
of Lords to read the closed material; the SIAC had considered these
materials and agreed that such an emergency existed.94 As observed by
Baroness Hale in A & Ors, while unwarranted declarations of emergency are
a familiar tool of tyranny, the Law Lords herein were considering the
84
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“immediate aftermath”95 of the unforgettable events of 9/11. In view of how
recent the attacks then were, how sensitive the intelligence on which the
national security assertions were based, and how fatal the consequences
could have been if the House of Lords had wrongly ruled against the
government when the crisis was still fresh, should the House of Lords have
ruled that there was no such public emergency merely because they were not
invited to view the closed material? As opined by Baroness Hale:
But any sensible court, like any sensible person, recognises the
limits of its expertise. Assessing the strength of a general threat
to the life of the nation is, or should be, within the expertise of
the Government and its advisers. They may, as recent events
have shown, not always get it right. But courts too do not
always get things right. It would be very surprising if the courts
were better able to make that sort of judgment than the
Government.96
On the other hand, some scholars have found “a trace of
schizophrenia”97 in the majority’s position, insofar as the Law Lords had
subsequently ruled that the national security measures taken were not strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation. 98 This view is also
misconceived. The Law Lords in A & Ors were fully justified to rule against
the Government because there was clear and convincing evidence available
that underscored the irrationality of the impugned State measures.99 Firstly,
the Government conceded that the threat posed by international terrorism
was not limited to foreigners; indeed almost 30 percent of the terrorist
suspects in the year prior to the A & Ors decision had been British
citizens.100 If measures short of detention without trial were sufficient to
deal with the threats posed by such a significant number of British terrorist
suspects, it should equally suffice for foreign suspects.101 More importantly,
these foreign suspects, even if certifiably dangerous, were allowed to leave
for other countries as near as France, where any surveillance of their actions
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would pose additional problems.102 This possibility seriously undermined
the State’s case for indefinite detention. Unlike the previous question of
whether the United Kingdom was in a state of public emergency, the House
of Lords herein had access to sufficient evidence to make an informed
determination against the Government. It is also important to note that the
Law Lords in A & Ors did not forbid the executive from detaining terrorist
suspects of all nationalities 103 (British or otherwise) indefinitely without
trial. In view of the available information they had about the irrationality of
the existing State measures, the House of Lords merely ruled against the
Executive’s choice to only detain indefinitely foreign suspects who could
not be deported to other countries.104 Seen under this light, the A & Ors
decision neither encapsulated a “muscular approach”105 to human rights nor
did it mark the beginnings of a “much belated judicial awakening.”106 A &
Ors is in fact a careful and rational judgment where the Law Lords took
account of its institutional deficits and ruled according to the evidence they
had.
The House of Lords continued to display this strand of judicial
pragmatism in the sequel to the A & Ors decision. In A v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department (No. 2),107 the Law Lords had to determine, inter
alia, whether the UK courts could receive evidence which had (or could
have) been procured by torture inflicted by foreign officials, without the
complicity of the British authorities.108 The House unanimously held that a
common law exclusionary rule existed that would prohibit the admission of
this foreign torture evidence.109 However, one must examine closely what
the Law Lords actually decided. The Law Lords did not state that it would
be a violation of the HRA for the government to statutorily authorize the
reception of such evidence. Instead, the Law Lords merely held that such
evidence could not be judicially received “in the absence of express
[statutory] language or necessary implication to the contrary.” 110
102
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Furthermore, the government remained free to arrest, search, or detain
persons on the strength of such foreign torture evidence.111 The common
law exclusionary rule would also not bar any judicial reliance on evidence
that was procured by inhuman or degrading treatment, short of torture.112
The only rift between the Law Lords in A (No. 2) was over the test to
be applied by the courts in determining whether the foreign evidence was
tainted by torture.113 In the end, Lord Hope’s more conservative stance
carried the day. The practical distinction between the majority approach
(Lords Hope, Rodger, Carswell, and Brown) and minority position (Lords
Bingham, Nicholls and Hoffmann) was summarized as follows: “[I]f the
SIAC [Special Immigration Appeals Commission] is left in doubt as to
whether the evidence was obtained [by torture], it should admit it . . . . Lord
Bingham’s position . . . is that if it is left in doubt SIAC should exclude the
evidence.”114
The House of Lords’ arguably equivocating approach toward human
rights may lead some to view the Court’s moral condemnation of torture as
no more than the “vacuous sound of dutifully paid lip-service.”115 But one
should examine more closely the rationale for the majority’s position before
one casts judgment. As observed by Lord Hope:
The circumstances in which the information [alleged foreign
torture evidence] was first obtained may be incapable of being
detected at all or at least of being determined without a long and
difficult inquiry which would not be practicable. So it would be
unrealistic to expect SIAC to demand that each piece of
information be traced to its ultimate source and the
circumstances in which it was obtained investigated so that it
could be proved piece by piece, that it was not obtained under
torture. The threshold cannot be put that high. Too often we
have seen how the lives of innocent victims and their families
are torn apart by terrorist outrages. Our revulsion against
torture . . . must not be allowed to create an insuperable barrier
for those who are doing their honest best to protect us.116
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The judiciary neither has the institutional advantage over the British
intelligence agencies in acquiring and verifying the source of the disputed
evidence, nor can it compel the executive to reveal the details of its
processes and methods of inquiries. In light of all these epistemic conditions
of uncertainty, it would have been foolhardy for the courts not to defer to the
executive’s assessment of the evidence’s admissibility when judges are left
in doubt as to whether it was obtained by foreign torture.
Gillan, R v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Anor,117
another House of Lords decision, was subject to much academic criticism.118
In that case, the Law Lords unanimously upheld Section 44 of the Terrorism
Act 2000,119 which provided that a senior police officer could authorize the
use of blanket stop and search powers in a designated area if he or she
considered it expedient for the prevention of terrorism, i.e. the police did not
need to have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person searched was
involved in terrorist activity.120
Even though there were no allegations of discrimination in the
particular stops and searches under challenge, a few Law Lords went on and
addressed the issue of ethnic-profiling in the counter-terrorism context.121
According to Lord Hope and Lord Brown, persons could not be stopped and
searched merely because they appeared to be of Asian heritage; however, the
police could rely on a person’s ethnic origin as an indicator so long as other
factors—e.g. age and behavior—were considered too.122
Civil libertarians, like Daniel Moeckli, accept that the prevention of
terrorism is a legitimate governmental interest; for them the central issue
was whether reliance on ethnic origin when determining whom to stop and
search could be deemed a proportionate means to achieve that goal.123 In
determining this, Moeckli observed that the following questions are
particularly relevant:
Does the use of ethnicity reflect specific intelligence or just
unexamined assumptions? Are terrorist profiles based on
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ethnic appearance accurate? . . . . Are stop and searches based
on ethnic profiling effective?124
While these are very valid questions, Moeckli’s subsequent criticisms
of the Court missed the mark. He castigated the Law Lords for not
providing evidence in support of the alleged link between Asian appearance
and increased likelihood of involvement in terrorist activities. He also
concluded that the use of such stop-and-search powers was unsuccessful
because such stops had led to only five arrests in connection with
terrorism.125
With regard to the first objection, one must note that the Home Office
offered, subject to procedural safeguards, to explore with the claimants its
reasons for authorizing the use of stop-and-search powers, but the latter had
rejected this offer.126 As Lord Scott observed, one could hardly expect the
judiciary to invalidate the stop-and-search authorization on the basis of an
alleged disproportionate nature of that response to a perceived threat of
terrorism, without the court having had the chance to review the intelligence
on which this assessment was based.127 This is especially true since it was
the claimants themselves who had effectively denied the Court this
opportunity of reviewing the material in the first place. 128 Moreover,
whether the police’s use of ethnic-profiling was justified would depend on
the circumstances of each case, and, since discrimination was not alleged by
the claimants, there was no need for the Court to provide a more complete
response on the issue. All the Court did was clarify that there was no per se
rule against the police’s use of ethnic origin as an indicator.
With regard to the second objection, Moeckli had wrongly assumed
that a certain police measure was unsuccessful merely because the arrest
rates were low. In deciding whether these stop-and search powers are
effective, one must not discount the deterrent value of such measures in
preventing crime in the first place.
Furthermore, it must be noted that this House of Lords decision was
handed down within months of the London bombing in 2005. When a
terror-related crisis has just occurred, it is not irrational for courts to be more
deferential to the executive on national security determinations, as judges do
not have the benefit of hindsight in assessing the severity of this new
124
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developing threat. The judicial choice to defer in Gillan was especially not
unreasonable as these searches, though annoying or distressing to the
persons concerned, were short-lived and were “not an interference of the
same order as, for example, an indefinite detention on undisclosed
grounds.”129 One must note that the author is in no way trivializing the
stigmatization and alienation certain ethnic groups may feel against law
enforcement agents; the author’s only point herein is that the Law Lords’
choice in Gillan to defer on the specific facts before them was not wrong at
law.130
Turning to the series of “control order” cases in 2007, while some
may lament that the House of Lords had legitimized this system in
general, 131 one must also note that the Law Lords were careful in
scrutinizing whether the specific curfews in question were excessive. So
whereas an eighteen-hour curfew was considered an unlawful deprivation of
the controlled persons’ liberty, 132 twelve-hour 133 and fourteen-hour 134
curfews were held not to be. The House of Lords refused to accept that the
absence of a realistic prospect of prosecution was a condition precedent to
the issue of a non-derogating control order. Nevertheless, the Court held
that there was an implicit continuing duty on the Secretary of State to
periodically inquire whether this prospect had increased with time, and it
was incumbent on the Secretary to provide the police with material that
might be relevant to any reconsideration of prosecution.135 In the same vein,
a majority of the House of Lords in Secretary of State for the Home
Department v. MB136 also accepted that the right to a fair trial as protected
under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights did not
impose a per se rule against the use of closed materials, and it would be up
to the trial judge to decide whether the fair trial requirements were met in the
circumstances of any particular control-order proceeding.137 Central to all of
these decisions was the Court’s fundamental concern about finding a
129
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solution “which occupies the moral high ground but at the same time serves
the public interest and is practicable.”138
As time has passed since the crisis mentality gripped the nation in
2005, one may now notice a gradual upsurge in judicial intervention. In
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF,139 the House of Lords
overturned its central holding in MB and held that the fair trial requirements
would never be satisfied if the case against the controlee was based to a
decisive degree on closed materials, regardless of how cogent these closed
materials were.140 This judicial change of mind in 2009 largely hinged on
two main factors: (1) in AF, for the first time in public, the House of Lords
had the benefit of full submissions by the special advocates about the
operations of closed control order hearing, and it was revealed that even the
special advocates had very limited informational access to these closed
materials; and (2) the Grand Chamber in A v. United Kingdom141 had since
ruled that the fair trial requirements would be violated in circumstances
where the case against the controlled person was primarily based on closed
materials.142 As the Court receives new and more complete information
about how a control order proceeding is conducted, and as the country
continues to remain free from new attacks on British soil, the Court, with the
passage of time, rightly recalibrates its intensity of review over executive
action in such matters.
It is thus unsurprising that by 2010, the Supreme Court, in Secretary
of State for the Home Department v. AP,143 was ready to rule against a
sixteen-hour curfew on a controlled person, coupled with an order of forced
relocation to an address 150 miles from his family.144 By then, the Court
was also less prepared to accept at face value the Secretary’s claim that
forced relocation was the only way of reducing the chances of the controlled
person’s contact with his associates who may be Islamic extremists,145 given
that other options were not explored and because of the profound impact
such social isolation had on the individual.146 Even then, the Court has been
equally cautious not to extend the AF principle to all statutorily authorized
138
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“closed” material procedures (“CMPs”).147 In Tariq v. Home Office,148 the
Supreme Court refused to impose an absolute requirement that the claimant,
an immigration officer who was dismissed after his security clearance was
withdrawn for national security reasons, be personally informed of the
allegations made against him in sufficient detail when he sued the State
before the Employment Tribunal, which had been statutorily authorized to
use CMPs.149 Unlike in AF, the Court in Tariq noted that the applicant was
not faced with the prospect of severe restrictions on his personal liberty
(unlike the claimants in A & Ors), as he was merely seeking damages
against the State in a civil suit on discrimination. 150 The Court thus
preferred to tilt the balance in favor of preserving the integrity of the security
vetting process and protecting the State from potentially costly
unmeritorious claims.151
Similarly, in the early years following the London bombing, the
House of Lords was prepared to subject foreign terror suspects that were
being deported to non-Member States of the Convention to lower standards
of human rights protection. This is because the Court did not want to be “in
the position to regulate the conduct of trials in the foreign countries from
which aliens come and to which they may have to be deported.”152 It is
evident that the Law Lords, in light of the epistemic uncertainties we
discussed earlier, were deferring to the State’s determination that these
foreign nationals were national security threats and should be removed.153
By 2012, the Supreme Court was ready to secure a fairer hearing for
such suspects before they were deported.154 In W (Algeria) v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department,155 the Supreme Court held that, in order for
courts to obtain all information needed to make a correct determination,
SIAC could make an absolute and irreversible order of non-disclosure,
prohibiting the Secretary of State from ever revealing the evidence or
identity of a witness called by the applicant resisting deportation on the
147
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ground that the witness would be treated poorly back home. 156 But
notwithstanding this laudable act of judicial moderation, pragmatism equally
prevailed as the Court decided that such orders should be sparingly granted
and that the Secretary, for national security reasons, may also seek to obtain
a waiver from the non-disclosure order.157 In a concurring opinion, Lord
Dyson also emphasized that such a non-disclosure order would unlikely be
granted in circumstances where breaches of other articles of the Convention
that are perceived to be less fundamental in nature—e.g. the right to family
life158—are alleged.159
This judicial sensitivity to national security considerations is most
pronounced in disputes where the Court is asked to review the conduct of the
government in the battlefield. In Secretary of State for Defence v. Al-Skeini
& Ors,160 the House of Lords held that five Iraqi applicants, who were
allegedly killed by British troops on patrol in the U.K.-occupied territory of
Basra, could not bring a Convention161 claim against the British government
because Basra was not within Britain’s effective control for the applicants to
be within the jurisdiction of the U.K.162 In particular, Lord Rodger, who
wrote the leading judgment, accepted the evidence of senior British officers
on the ground that “the available British troops faced formidable difficulties
due to terrorist activity, the volatile situation and the lack of any effective
Iraqi security forces.” 163 Nevertheless, the Court accepted that a sixth
applicant, who was killed in a U.K. military detention facility in Basra, was
within the UK’s jurisdiction.164 One must note that this jurisdictional point
was first conceded by the government.165 As astutely observed by Marko
Milanovic, this case underscored the tensions in the policy considerations
underpinning the law: the House of Lords did not want to open the
floodgates of litigation by micromanaging the use of force in the battlefield;
however, no national security concerns justified the killing of a defenseless
156
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prisoner detained in a British facility.166 In the same vein, in Al-Jedda v.
Secretary of State for Defence,167 the House of Lords accepted that the UN
Security Council Resolution 1546 could qualify a detainee’s Convention
rights.168 Professor Kent Roach has since expressed concern that the House
of Lords allowed the Security Council Resolution to displace human rights
obligations in the Convention;169 however, the Law Lords’ ruling was in fact
more minimalistic and narrower than Roach had perceived it to be. As
observed by Lord Bingham—who wrote the leading judgment—the
Resolution authorized the UK government to lawfully detain persons, where
it was necessary, for imperative reasons of security, but their Convention
rights could not be “infringed to any greater extent than is inherent in such
detention.”170 Their Lordships were silent on whether the specific detention
in question was no more than necessary.171 The judicial choice to reserve
judgment on this important issue was most emphatically underscored by
Baroness Hale in the following terms:
We have devoted little attention to the precise scope of the
authorisation. There must still be room for argument about
what is precisely covered by the resolution and whether it
applies on the facts of this case. Quite how that is to be done
remains for decision in the other proceedings.172
In the same vein, the House of Lords in R (Gentle) v. The Prime Minister173
unanimously rejected the argument that the right to life as protected under
Article 2 of the Convention imposed a duty on the State to take timely steps
to obtain reliable legal advice before committing its troops to armed
conflicts overseas.174 In particular, Lord Bingham, who wrote the leading
judgment, emphasized as follows: “Thus the restraint traditionally shown by
the courts in ruling on what has been called high policy—peace and war, the
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making of treaties, the conduct of foreign relations—does tend to militate
against the existence of the right.”175
As the national security emergency wanes with time, like the controlorder disputes, the Court has become comparatively more assertive vis-à-vis
the executive. 176 In Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs v. Yunus Rahmatullah,177 the Supreme Court unanimously held in
late 2012 that the British government was required to request the return of
Rahmatullah, a Pakistani captured by British forces in Iraq, from the
Americans, who had transferred him to Afghanistan without the United
Kingdom’s approval. 178 Interestingly, the Court did not consider this
intervention as a form of judicial intrusion into foreign affairs. Instead, Lord
Kerr, who wrote the leading judgment, observed that the grant of habeas
corpus did not require the British government “to act in any particular way
in order to demonstrate whether they could or could not exert control”179
over Rahmatullah, as the government was merely required to establish
whether such control existed in fact.180 However, as Professor Kent Roach
has pointed out, this argument is unconvincing, as the only realistic way for
the United Kingdom to establish whether it had effective control over
Rahmatullah was for the courts to actively require the British government to
request the United States to return him to U.K. custody.181 Nevertheless, by
a five-to-two majority, the Court refused to further review the adequacy of
Britain’s subsequent diplomatic moves and accepted that the U.K.
government had made a bona fide—albeit unsuccessful—attempt to secure
Rahmatullah’s return from the United States.182 While some critics may
lament that the light of the rule of law has not penetrated far enough into the
dark and murky waters of national security, 183 one must concede that
Rahmatullah is ground-breaking so far as the Court has indeed treaded into
the traditionally forbidden terrains of foreign relations.
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CONCLUSION

In the foregoing analysis, this article attempts to account for why the
Court has been seemingly inconsistent on national security policy. In
essence, the Court, like all other appellate courts, is cognizant of the
institutional advantages and disadvantages of its office.184 While the Court
understands that it has the advantage of independence from the immediate
political environment, which makes it less likely to be biased against
unpopular claimants, this insulation also poses an institutional problem for
the Court. The judiciary is limited by its access to the information possessed
by the executive and an under-appreciation of the interlocking consequences
of individual decisions, as well as its inability to react swiftly to changing
circumstances.185 This institutional dilemma is inherent in all disputes, but it
is particularly heightened in national security controversies, where the
consequences of any judicial errors can be catastrophic for the nation.
Critics of judicial deference in times of war often frame the problem
as a character failing (i.e. judges need to have more courage), but in truth,
there are deeper institutional reasons for deference that consistently lead
judges to define their roles in specific ways during times of crisis.186 On the
other hand, executive unilateralists overvalue the informational handicap of
the courts and pay insufficient credence to the incentives the executive has
in prolonging the length of an emergency measure or exaggerating its
necessity. In reality, the Court has avoided either extreme position.187 When
a new emergency surfaces, judges defer, as they are aware that the stakes are
high and their information limited; this need to defer diminishes when the
observable events giving rise to the crisis recedes and the Court obtains
more information that narrows the epistemic gap between the judiciary and
the executive.188 Therefore, in practice, the Court is neither “awestruck by
the mantra of national security,”189 nor is it oblivious to the dangers of
applying no deference in the review of national security disputes.
In the final analysis, the false belief that either the legislature or the
judiciary may singularly and sufficiently defend the constitutional values of
a society imposes a burden that neither branch of government can bear.190 It
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sets up unrealistic expectations that only invite disappointments or, worse,
court disasters. 191 Constitutional interpretation relies on “judgment, not
algorithm; it requires judicial self-discipline, located within a particular
community’s interpretive traditions, and [is] based on an appreciation for the
limited but important role of judges in a democracy.”192 In seeking to meet
the evolving challenges of national security while protecting the
fundamental values of a civilized society, the Court must continue to weave
this legal narrative that conjoins the best in both administration and
adjudication.
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